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The Untouchable Executive Authority:
Trump and The Section 232 Tariffs on Steel
and Aluminum
Arim Jenny Kim*
In 2018, President Trump championed his way through the
imposition of the Section 232 Tariffs—a heavy tax on various
imports, including steel and aluminum—by broadcasting a
supposedly-imminent threat to the U.S. national security. This
plea, however, has been criticized as a veil for President Trump’s
economic protectionism policy. Meanwhile, others have
questioned the constitutionality of the statute creating the
President’s authority to impose these tariffs in the first place. This
Comment explores the issues arising from President Trump’s
Section 232 Tariffs on steel and aluminum: (1) the validity and
justiciability of President Trump’s actions under Section 232 of
the Trade Expansion Act of 1962, and (2) the constitutionality of
Section 232.
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INTRODUCTION
President Donald J. Trump, an advocate of tariffs, has upended the
traditional U.S. trade policy as evidenced by his recent actions.1 Tariffs—
taxes on imports—are a method of safeguarding a country’s domestic
industries as a form of economic and trade protectionism.2 By taxing
imported foreign goods, tariffs raise the price of imports for domestic
consumers and limit domestic manufacturers’ competition with foreign
products.3
The United States once revered a policy of economic protectionism,
which supported the growth of American businesses, and successfully
enacted tariffs to strengthen its economy during the Great Depression.4
Nevertheless, this policy was short-lived in the United States due to the
diplomatic frictions that resulted from tariffs.5
After World War II, the United States changed its course of trade and
adopted a primarily neoliberal trade policy, which promotes open markets
and free trade, that resulted in the international growth of American
businesses.6 Since the adoption of neoliberalism, tariffs have been
imposed conservatively around the world due to what has become
generally accepted as their irreparable economic, diplomatic, and legal

See Chad P. Brown & Melina Kolb, Trump’s Trade War Timeline: An Up-to-Date
Guide, PETERSON INST. FOR INT’L ECON. (Aug. 23, 2019), https://piie.com/blogs/tradeinvestment-policy-watch/trump-trade-war-china-date-guide.
2
See Kimberly Amadeo, Trade Protectionism Methods With Examples, Pros, and
Cons: Why Protectionism Feels So Good But Is So Wrong, THE BALANCE (Jul. 10, 2019),
https://www.thebalance.com/what-is-trade-protectionism-3305896.
3
See id.
4
See id.; see e.g., Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, Pub. L. 71–361, ch. 497, 46 Stat.
590 (1930) (codified as amended 19 U.S.C. ch. 4).
5
See Arthur MacEwan, The Neoliberal Disorder: The Inconsistencies of Trade Policy,
THE NORTH AMERICAN CONGRESS ON LATIN AMERICA (Sept. 25, 2007),
https://nacla.org/article/neoliberal-disorder-inconsistencies-trade-policy; Amadeo, supra
note 1.
6
See MacEwan, supra note 4.
1
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harms.7 Under the Trump Administration, however, the fate of American
neoliberalism is uncertain as the White House retrogrades through the
history of trade policies by embracing tariffs once again.8
Since 2018, President Trump has applied various tariffs by
proclaiming foreign imports as national security threats.9 For example,
pursuant to Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962 (“Section
232”),10 the Department of Commerce (the “DoC”) conducted
investigations on the steel and aluminum industry and concluded that
imported steel and aluminum “threaten to impair national security.”11
Thereafter, President Trump took action “to protect America”12 by
imposing the Section 232 Tariffs: a 25 percent tariff on imported steels on
March 8, 2018,13 and a 10 percent tariff on imported aluminums on March
15, 2018.14 The President portrayed these tariffs as an American victory
against countries attempting to export into the United States by
characterizing tariffs as “a lot of money coming into the coffers of the
United States of America.”15

See S.K., Why Tariffs Are Bad Taxes, THE ECONOMIST (July 31, 2018),
https://www.economist.com/the-economist-explains/2018/07/31/why-tariffs-are-badtaxes.
8
See Mehdi Noorbaksh, The Fate of Neoliberalism Under Trump, FAIR OBSERVER (Jan.
17, 2017), https://www.fairobserver.com/region/north_america/neoliberalism-donaldtrump-united-states-america-news-43540/.
9
See Brown & Kolb, supra note 1.
10
19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A) (1962).
11
Shannon Togawa Mercer & Matthew Kahn, America Trades Down: The Legal
Consequences of President Trump’s Tariffs, LAWFARE (Mar. 13, 2018),
https://www.lawfareblog.com/america-trades-down-legal-consequences-presidenttrumps-tariffs.
12
PRESS RELEASE, THE WHITE HOUSE, WHAT YOU NEED TO KNOW: SECTION 232
INVESTIGATIONS AND TARIFFS (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.whitehouse.gov/briefingsstatements/need-know-section-232-investigations-tariffs/.
13
Although the DoC recommended a 24 percent tariff on steel, President Trump
increased the number to 25 percent because a round number “sounded better” to him.
Jonathan Swan, Inside the White House Trade Fights, AXIOS (Feb. 25, 2018),
https://www.axios.com/inside-the-white-house-trade-fights-1519601322-5de818bf-478742a5-9e7e-f780f4e2ebef.html.
14
See Scott Horsley, Trump Formally Orders Tariffs on Steel and Aluminum Imports,
NPR (Mar. 8, 2018), https://www.npr.org/2018/03/08/591744195/trump-expected-toformally-order-tariffs-on-steel-aluminum-imports; see also Adjusting Imports of
Aluminum Into the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. 11619 (Mar. 15, 2018); Adjusting Imports
of Steel Into the United States, 83 Fed. Reg. 11625 (Mar. 8, 2018).
15
Peter Coy, The Real Pain From Trump’s Tariffs Trickles Down to Consumers,
BLOOMBERG (Sept. 28, 2018), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2018-0928/who-pays-for-trump-s-tariffs.
7
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Similarly, in January 2018, President Trump levied safeguard tariffs
on imported residential washing machines and solar panels.16 This action
was premised on Section 201 of the Trade Act of 1974 examination by the
United States International Trade Commission, which concluded that
“increased foreign imports of washers and solar panels and modules are a
substantial cause of serious injury to domestic manufacturers.”17
Moreover, on March 22, 2018, the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (the “USTR”) released a report from its investigation under
Section 301 of the Trade Act of 1974, which found that China’s trade
practices related to technology transfer, intellectual property, and
innovation were unreasonable and discriminatory.18 As a result of the
Section 301 examination, a tariff-tug-of-war between the United States
and China has ensued, as both countries have taken turns increasing their
respective rates on tariffs and quotas on a wide range of consumer goods.19
Although President Trump has justified the tariffs by characterizing
them as necessities in response to national security threats, some
constituencies have criticized the President’s actions.20 Many scholars fear
that the retaliation by trading partners, which may issue reciprocal tariffs
and quotas on American goods, could result in a full-blown trade war that
destroys the global economy.21 In response to critics’ fear and public

See David J. Lynch, Trump Imposes Tariffs on Solar Panels and Washing Machines
in First Major Trade Action of 2018, WASHINGTON POST (Jan. 22, 2018),
https://www.washingtonpost.com/news/wonk/wp/2018/01/22/trump-imposes-tariffs-onsolar-panels-and-washing-machines-in-first-major-tradeaction/?utm_term=.b496b394abdf.
17
See Press Release, Office of the U.S. Trade Representative, President Trump
Approves Relief for U.S. Washing Machine and Solar Panel Cell Manufacturers (Jan. 22,
2018),
https://ustr.gov/about-us/policy-offices/press-office/pressreleases/2018/january/president-trump-approves-relief-us; see also U.S. Int’l Trade
Comm’n, Large Residential Washers – Investigation No. TA-201-076, Publication 4745
(2017); U.S. Int’l Trade Comm’n, Crystalline Silicon Photovoltaic Cells (Whether or not
Partially or Fully Assembled into Other Products) – Investigation No. TA-201-75,
Publication 4739 (2017).
18
See OFFICE OF THE U.S. TRADE REPRESENTATIVE, FINDINGS OF THE INVESTIGATION
INTO CHINA’S ACTS, POLICIES, AND PRACTICES RELATED TO TECHNOLOGY TRANSFER,
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, AND INNOVATION UNDER SECTION 301 OF THE TRADE ACT OF
1974 (2018); see also Brown & Kolb, supra note 1.
19
See Brown & Kolb, supra note 1.
20
See Shrutee Sarkar, Economists united: Trump Tariffs Won’t Help the Economy,
REUTERS (Mar. 13, 2018, 8:32 PM), https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-economypoll/economists-united-trump-tariffs-wont-help-the-economy-idUSKCN1GQ02G.
21
See id. (Economists have expressed their concern that “tariffs on steel and aluminum
imports would lead to a wider trade war.” One economist expressed that “[i]t will be very
surprising if there isn’t some measured retaliation overtime from major trading partners.”).
16
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outcry against the Trump Administration’s use of tariffs,22 there have been
judicial and congressional attempts to halt these tariffs and prohibit
President Trump from imposing more.23 These efforts have not yet been
unsuccessful, however, due to statutory provisions that provide the
president with nearly exclusive power to control American trade policy.24
This Comment questions and analyzes how the vital power to govern the
American economy and its trade has been delegated to the Executive.
Although the Trump Administration has begun to apply numerous
special tariffs since 2018,25 this Comment solely focuses on the Section
232 Tariffs on the steel and aluminum industry (the “Section 232 Tariffs”).
Part I presents the legal background of Section 232 and the enactment of
the Section 232 Tariffs. Part II investigates and analyzes the issues
surrounding the justiciability of the Section 232 Tariffs, and the
constitutionality of the statute. Part III introduces pending legislative bills
relating to Section 232 (as of August 2019). Lastly, Part IV concludes with
an outlook to the future of Section 232 and the inevitable consequences of
the Section 232 Tariffs.

I. THE SECTION 232 TARIFFS ON STEEL AND ALUMINUM
A. Section 232 of the Trade Expansion Act of 1962
Pursuant to Section 232, the Secretary of Commerce (the “Secretary”)
may conduct a Section 232 investigation to “determine the effects on the
national security of imports” upon a request for investigation from an
interested party or a self-initiation by the Secretary.26 Within 270 days of
the investigation, the Secretary is then required to provide the president
with a report on the findings of the investigation—specifically, whether an
item “is being imported into the United States in such quantities or under
such circumstances as to threaten to impair the national security.”27
Thereafter, the president must conclude whether he or she concurs with
the Secretary’s findings within 90 days of receiving the report.28
If the president agrees with the findings, he or she has the power to
“determine the nature and duration of the action that, in the judgment of
E.g., Clark Packard & Megan Reiss, Steel Protectionism Won’t Protect National
Security, LAWFARE (Jan. 12, 2018, 7:29 PM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/steelprotectionism-wont-protect-national-security; Sarkar, supra note 20.
23
See infra Part IV; see also Mercer & Kahn, supra note 11.
24
See infra Part III.
25
Brown & Kolb, supra note 1.
26
19 U.S.C. § 1862(b)(1)(A).
27
Id. § 1862(b)(3)(A).
28
Id. § 1862(c)(1).
22
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the [p]resident, must be taken to adjust the imports of the article and its
derivatives so that such imports will not threaten to impair the national
security.”29 In essence, the statute grants the president sole discretion to
adjust imports in any way he or she dictates due to the lack of guidance
and limitations on the methods of adjustment. In determining whether an
import impairs the national security, however, Section 232(d) outlines the
following factors to consider:
domestic production needed for projected national
defense requirements, the capacity of domestic industries
to meet such requirements, existing and anticipated
availabilities of the human resources, products, raw
materials, and other supplies and services essential to the
national defense, the requirements of growth of such
industries and such supplies and services including the
investment, exploration, and development necessary to
assure such growth, and the importation of goods in terms
of their quantities, availabilities, character, and use as
those affect such industries and the capacity of the United
States to meet national security requirements . . . [,] the
close relation of the economic welfare of the Nation to our
national security, . . . the impact of foreign competition on
the economic welfare of individual domestic industries;
and any substantial unemployment, decrease in revenues
of government, loss of skills or investment, or other
serious effects resulting from the displacement of any
domestic products by excessive imports . . . .30
Although Section 232(d) includes a suggestive list of elements that could
potentially affect national security, the statute does not provide legislative
or judicial remedy for the president’s actions taken against imports.31
However, the statute does provide a special exception to petroleum
products: any action “to adjust imports of petroleum or petroleum products
shall cease to have force and effect upon the enactment of [Congress’s]
disapproval resolution.”32
Between Congress’s enactment of Section 232 in 1962 and President
Trump’s inauguration in 2017, there were 26 Section 232 investigations.33
Id. § 1862(c)(1)(A).
Id. § 1862(d).
31
See id.; see infra Part II.B.2.
32
Id. § 1862(f)(1).
33
See RACHEL F. FEFER & VIVIAN C. JONES, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., IF10667, SECTION
232 OF THE TRADE EXPANSION ACT OF 1962 (2018).
29
30

182

UNIVERSITY OF MIAMI BUSINESS LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 28:176

Of the 26 investigations, the DoC found that 62% of the time the subject
of the investigations did not threaten national security.34 In fact, only five
of those investigations resulted in presidential action, only two of which
constituted legitimate executive action: an embargo on crude oil from Iran
in 1979, and an embargo on crude oil from Libya in 1982.35 Of the other
three instances, two actions were based on a pre-existing initiative that
predated Section 232 and thus, did not raise executive power issues.36 The
remaining action—President Carter’s action to impose a gasoline
conservation fee on petroleum products—was held illegal in 1980 because
the Trade Expansion Act “does not authorize the President to impose
general controls on domestically produced goods.”37 Although “a
regulation on imports may incidentally regulate domestic goods,” the
District Court for the District Court of Columbia found that President
Carter’s conservation fee had a greater impact on domestically produced
oil than imported oil as it affected all gasoline sales, including domestic
products.38 Furthermore, none of the five presidential actions constituted
an increase of existing tariffs and quotas.

B. The Enactment of the Section 232 Tariffs
In April 2017, Secretary of Commerce Wilbur Ross initiated Section
232 investigations to determine the effects of imported steel and aluminum
on national security.39 Thereafter, in January 2018, the DoC submitted two
reports (collectively, the “Section 232 Reports”) that outlined the
Secretary’s findings and recommendations: The Effects of Imports of Steel
on the National Security,40 and The Effects of Imports of Aluminum on the
National Security.41

These embargoes were later superseded by economic sanctions. RACHEL F. FEFER ET
SERV., R45249, SECTION 232 INVESTIGATIONS: OVERVIEW AND
(2019).
35
See id. at 3–4.
36
See FEFER & JONES, supra note 33.
37
Indep. Gasoline Marketers Council, Inc. v. Duncan, 492 F. Supp. 614, 618 (D.D.C.
1980); see also id. at 620 (“It is clear that Congress, not the President, must decide whether
the imposition of a gasoline conservation fee is good policy.”).
38
Id. at 618.
39
See FEFER ET AL., supra note 34, at 5–6; David Lawder, U.S. Launches National
Security Probe into Aluminum Imports, REUTERS (April 27, 2017, 10:06 AM),
https://www.reuters.com/article/us-usa-trade-aluminum/u-s-launches-national-securityprobe-into-aluminum-imports-idUSKBN17T044.
40
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF STEEL ON THE NATIONAL
SECURITY (2018) [hereinafter Steel Report].
41
U.S. DEP’T OF COMMERCE, THE EFFECT OF IMPORTS OF ALUMINUM ON THE NATIONAL
SECURITY (2018) [hereinafter Aluminum Report].
34

AL., CONG. RESEARCH
ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 3
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The Section 232 Reports found that the importing rates and global
overproduction of steel and aluminum threaten to impair national security
and thus, recommended the strengthening of tariffs on these imports.42 The
Secretary urged President Trump to limit these imports to promote
American utilization of the domestic steel and aluminum industries,
increase the availability of domestic production for national defense
requirements, protect American economic welfare, and increase the
employment rate.43 The Section 232 Reports also claimed that
international suppliers may pose as threats by cutting supply off when the
United States urgently requires those supplies, such as in wartime.44 By
emphasizing the significance of these imports in protecting the nation’s
economy and security, the Secretary “conclude[d] that the present
quantities and circumstances of steel imports are ‘weakening our internal
economy’ and threaten to impair the national security as defined in Section
232.”45
Upon receipt of the Section 232 Reports, President Trump
subsequently imposed a 25 percent tariff on imported steel on March 8,
2018,46 and a 10 percent tariff on imported aluminum on March 15, 2018.47
The Section 232 Tariffs covered an estimated value of $48 billion in steel
and aluminum imports, mostly from foreign exporters that are American
allies.48 Initially, President Trump excluded only Canada and Mexico,
which amounted to one-third of the covered imports valued at $15.3
billion.49 However, President Trump established an exclusion process for
trading partners to negotiate with the USTR and request for exemptions
while permitting corporations to file separate petitions with the DoC to
exclude specific products from the tariffs.50 Thus, more nations are now
exempted by way of the exclusion process.51
Since the levy of the Section 232 Tariffs, President Trump revised his
proclamations multiple times to extend exemptions to certain countries
while removing exemptions that were previously granted to others.52
Despite the additional exemptions and amendments to the Section 232
Tariffs, numerous trading partners have retaliated or threatened the United
See Steel Report, supra note 40, at 2–5; Aluminum Report, supra note 41, at 23–62.
See Steel Report, supra note 40, at 2–5; Aluminum Report, supra note 41, at 23–62.
44
See Steel Report, supra note 40, at 2–5.
45
Id. at 5.
46
Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,625 (Mar. 8, 2018).
47
Proclamation No. 9704, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,619 (Mar. 15, 2018).
48
See Brown & Kolb, supra note 1, at 3.
49
See id.; Proclamation No. 9705, 83 Fed. Reg. 11,627.
50
See FEFER ET AL., supra note 34, at 7; see, e.g., 15 C.F.R. pt. 705 (2018).
51
See Brown & Kolb, supra note 1, at 3.
52
See Brown & Kolb, supra note 1; see, e.g., Proclamation No. 9711, 83 Fed. Reg.
13,361, 13,363 (Mar. 22, 2018).
42
43
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States with reciprocal tariffs and quotas on American products.53 In July
2018, President Trump filed claims against these countries at the World
Trade Organization to challenge their tariffs on American products;
however, these claims have only exasperated the trade frictions.54

C. Public Response to the Section 232 Tariffs
Despite the DoC’s rationale for its finding that steel and aluminum
imports threaten national security, the Department of Defense (the “DoD”)
expressed its concern for “the [tariffs’] negative impact on [the American]
key allies.”55 In its memorandum published in response to the Section 232
Reports, the DoD stated that the steel and aluminum imports do not
“impact the ability of DoD programs to acquire the steel and aluminum
necessary to meet national defense requirements.”56 Furthermore, many
economists and politicians have vocalized their doubt on Secretary Ross’s
recommendations due to their fear for the “global trade war”57 and its
eventual impacts on consumers, including the rise in the price of consumer
goods.58 Various American companies have opined that tariffs function as
a tax on American businesses and consumers, not on the exporting
countries.59 Additionally, the findings of the 232 Reports have been
criticized as a means for President Trump to opportunistically use national
security as a veil for his economic protectionism policies.60
See Brown & Kolb, supra note 1.
See id.
55
See Memorandum from the Sec’y of Defense with Response to Steel and Aluminum
Policy Recommendations to the Sec’y of Commerce (2018) (on file with the U.S. Dep’t of
Commerce).
56
See id.
57
Tariffs have reportedly caused major trade frictions between the United States and its
trading partners. See e.g., A Quick Guide to the US-China Trade War, BBC (Dec. 12,
2019), https://www.bbc.com/news/business-50784554 (In 18 months, “the US has
imposed tariffs on more than $360bn . . . of Chinese goods, and China has retaliated with
tariffs on more than $110bn of US products.”); Keith Johnson, U.S.-Europe Trade War
Reerupts in London, FOREIGN POLICY (Dec. 3, 2019, 4:23 PM),
https://foreignpolicy.com/2019/12/03/nato-trump-europe-trade-war-digital-tax-google/
(In response to the U.S.’s tariff on French luxury brands, France imposes a digital services
tax on U.S. tech companies.); Ana Swanson, Trump Says U.S. Will Impose Metal Tariffs
YORK
TIMES
(Dec.
2,
2019),
on
Brazil
and
Argentina,
NEW
https://www.nytimes.com/2019/12/02/business/economy/trump-tariffs-brazil-argentinametal.html (President Trump announced to impose tariffs on Brazil and Argentina after
accusing them of manipulating their currencies and hurting American farmers.).
58
See, e.g., Packard & Reiss, supra note 22; Sarkar, supra note 20 (“The median
probability of a recession in the coming year was 13 percent.”).
59
Mark Niquette, Business Groups Line Up Behind Limits to Trump’s Tariff Powers,
BLOOMBERG (Feb. 4, 2019), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-0204/business-groups-line-up-behind-limits-to-trump-s-tariff-powers.
60
See Packard & Reiss, supra note 22.
53
54
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II. THE UNTOUCHABLE EXECUTIVE AUTHORITY UNDER SECTION
232
A. The Validity and Justiciability of the Section 232 Tariffs
The Constitution enshrines the doctrine of separation of powers and
the system of checks and balances into the power-structure of the federal
government.61 The federal government is comprised of three branches: (i)
the Legislative Branch, which is composed of the House of
Representatives and the Senate;62 (ii) the Executive Branch, which
includes the President, the Vice-President, and the Departments;63 and (iii)
the Judicial Branch, which is headed by the Supreme Court.64 These
branches have distinct and limited authority as enumerated in separate
Articles of the Constitution,65 which grant each branch the ability to check
the actions of the others to prohibit inter-branch encroachment and abuse
of power.66
Accordingly, the Constitution provides Congress with enumerated
legislative authority under Article I, including the power “to lay and
collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises”67 as well as the power “[t]o
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations.”68 The exclusivity of this
authority, however, has been blurred throughout history as Congress has
explicitly and implicitly relayed some of its authority to the president.69
Although the delegations of authority may seem antithetical to the doctrine
See generally T.J. Halstead, Cong. Research Serv., R44334, The Separation of Powers
Doctrine: An Overview of Its Rationale and Application 10 (1999) (“While the
Constitution provides separate institutions and bases of power, the structure does not
insulate the branches from each other.”).
62
U.S. Const. art. I.
63
Id. art. II.
64
Id. art. III.
65
See id. art. I; Id. art. II; Id. art. III.
66
See Halstead, supra note 61, at 10; Nathan S. Chapman & Michael W. McConell, Due
Process as Separation of Powers, 121 Yale L.J. 1672, 1781 (2012) (“The basic idea of due
process . . . was that the law of the land required each branch of government to operate in
a distinctive manner . . . .”).
67
U.S. Const. art. I, §8, cl. 1.
68
Id. art. I, §8, cl. 3; see also Kathleen Claussen, Trade War Battles: Congress
Reconsiders Its Role, Lawfare (Aug. 5, 2018), https://www.lawfareblog.com/trade-warbattles-congress-reconsiders-its-role (“Congress has regularly empowered the executive to
manage foreign commerce without the checks that it has accorded itself in other areas.”).
69
E.g., Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 582 (1952) (“whether
the President was acting within his constitutional power when he issued an order directing
the Secretary of Commerce to take possession of and operate most of the Nation's steel
mills.”); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) (whether President Clinton’s
authority to cancel provisions in the Balanced Budget Act and the Taxpayer Relief Act of
1997 was constitutional).
61
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of separation of powers, the Supreme Court has held that Congress can
delegate its authority to the Executive:
When the President acts pursuant to an express or implied
authorization of Congress, his authority is at its
maximum, for it includes all that he possesses in his own
right plus all that Congress can delegate. . . . [An action]
executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress
would be supported by the strongest of presumptions and
the widest latitude of judicial interpretation, and the
burden of persuasion would rest heavily upon any who
might attack it.70
Accordingly, the president has the maximum level of authority when
he or she acts pursuant to the delegated power from Congress, even if such
prerogative is not enumerated in the Constitution.71 As such, because the
executive action in adjusting imports is within the delegated authority
under Section 232, “the Executive’s decisions in the sphere of
international trade are reviewable only to determine whether the
[p]resident’s action falls within his delegated authority, whether the
statutory language has been properly construed, and whether the
[p]resident’s action conforms with the relevant procedural
requirements.”72 The authorization of power from Congress affords the
president with a blanket protection from judicial review because “the
[p]resident’s findings of fact and the motivations for his action are not
subject to review.”73 Accordingly President Trump holds the maximum
level of power to control and adjust imports—specifically, the authority to
impose the Section 232 Tariffs on any import that he perceives as a threat
to the United States.74 Moreover, Section 232 protects President Trump
and the Section 232 Tariffs from judicial review unless there is evidence
of the President’s misconstruction of Section 232.75
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635 (6-3 decision) (Jackson, J.,
concurring).
71
See id.
72
Florsheim Shoe Co., Div. of Interco, Inc. v. United States, 744 F.2d 787, 795 (Fed.
Cir. 1984).
73
Maple Leaf Fish Co. v. United States, 762 F.2d 86, 89 (Fed. Cir. 1985) (“[T]he
President’s findings of fact and the motivations for his action are not subject to review.”).
74
See Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co., 343 U.S. at 635.
75
Because Section 232 serves as a direct constitutional authority for the imposition of
the Section 232 Tariffs, “[the President’s] motives, his reasoning, his finding of facts
requiring the action, and his judgment are immune from judicial scrutiny.” U.S. Cane Sugar
Refiners’ Ass’n v. Block, 683 F.2d 399, 404 (C.C.P.A. 1982); see Severstal Exp. GmbH v.
United States, No. 18-37, slip op. at 15–16 (U.S. Ct. Int’l Trade Apr. 5, 2018) (“To the
70
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In Severstal Exp. GmbH v. United States, the U.S. Court of
International Trade (the “CIT”) confronted the validity of President
Trump’s Section 232 Tariffs: whether President Trump’s imposition of the
Section 232 Tariffs exceeded his statutory authority by utilizing Section
232 as a veil for economic protectionism.76 However, the court refused to
discuss the validity of the tariffs because the court “lack[ed] the power to
review the President’s lawful exercise of discretion.”77 Nevertheless, by
distinguishing between the substance of the President’s exercise of
discretion pursuant to a governing statute and his misinterpretation of such
statute, the CIT held that “the court may review the executive’s actions for
‘clear misconstruction’ of such limiting language.”78
Because President Trump’s exercise of discretion was nonjusticiable,79 the Severstal court focused on whether Section 232
authorized the President to impose the tariffs in response to an economic
situation.80 The court found that Section 232 is comprised of broad and
permissive language, which does not “foreclose[] the President from
finding a threat to national security due to the overall economic situation
of the steel industry.”81 According to the court, the factors outlined in
Section 232(d) encompass economic factors, including any pretextual
motives, such as President Trump’s attempt to use tariffs in trade
negotiations to draw concessions from other countries and bolster his
position in diplomatic conventions.82 Thus, the CIT held that President
Trump’s determination and use of national security for economic
reasons—even if, as a veil for economic policies—are valid exercise of
power because these economic rationales are consistent with Section 232
executive authority.83
Despite public criticism against President Trump’s use of Section 232,
the Severstal court foreclosed any future possibilities to attack the
executive actions relating to the Section 232 Tariffs.84 Thus, the American

extent the court may review the action of the President, it is unlikely that the President
exceeded his statutory authority.”).
76
See Severstal Exp. GmbH, slip. op. at 5.
77
Id.; see also Corus Group PLC v. ITC, 352 F.3d 1351, 1361 (Fed. Cir. 2003).
78
Severstal Exp. GmbH, slip. op. at 16; see Maple Leaf Fish Co., 762 F.2d at 89 (“For
a court to interpose, there has to be a clear misconstruction of the governing statute, a
significant procedural violation, or action outside delegated authority.”).
79
See Severstal Exp. GmbH, slip op. at 15–17.
80
See id. at 15–16, 18, 21.
81
Id. at 22.
82
See id. at 21–22.
83
See id. at 22.
84
See id. at 22–23.
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Institute for International Steel, Inc. (the “AIIS”),85 took a different
approach to challenge the Section 232 Tariffs by asserting that Section 232
improperly delegates the legislative authority to the President and thus,
violates the Constitution.86

B. The Constitutionality of Section 232
Because President Trump’s levy of the Section 232 Tariffs is a nonjusticiable issue,87 the AIIS has challenged the constitutionality of Section
232. The AIIS asserts that Section 232 unconstitutionally delegates
Congress’s enumerated power to the President, thereby violating the
doctrine of separation of powers and the system of checks and balances
enshrined in the Constitution.88 However, the Supreme Court has held
otherwise in Yakus v. United States: Nor does the doctrine of separation of
powers deny to Congress power to direct that an administrative officer
properly designated for that purpose have ample latitude within which he
is to ascertain the conditions which Congress has made prerequisite to the
operation of its legislative command.89

i.

The Intelligible Principle Test

Arguably, Section 232 creates an imbalance of power delegated
between Congress and the Executive. It raises issues of separation of
powers and checks and balances by creating an executive power to “adjust
the imports”90 in response to a national threat. Although Section 232’s
delegation of power appears to be in conflict with the Constitution, the
Supreme Court has held that a delegation of legislative power to the
Executive is permitted as long as the statute provides an intelligible
principle.91

The American Institute for International Steel is a non-profit membership corporation
that supports free trade of steel. On behalf of its 120 members, it brought action against the
United States. About AIIS, AMERICAN INSTITUTE FOR INTERNATIONAL STEEL,
http://www.aiis.org/about/.
86
See Complaint at 1, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-00152
(U.S. Ct. Int’l Trade Jun. 27, 2018).
87
See Severstal Exp. GmbH, slip op. at 16–17.
88
Complaint, supra note 86, at 5–8.
89
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 425 (1944).
90
19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(B) (1962).
91
See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 409 (1928) (“If
Congress shall lay down by legislative act an intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to fix such rates is directed to conform, such legislative action is not a
forbidden delegation of legislative power.”); see also Chapman & McConell, supra note
66, at 1785 (“For much of our history, Congress and the Supreme Court operated on the
loose but workable assumption that Congress could delegate legislative power – the power
85
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In essence, if Congress delegates its authority to another branch of
government and provides “an intelligible principle to which the person or
body authorized to [act] is directed to conform, such legislative action is
not a forbidden delegation of legislative power.”92 As such, a delegation
of legislative power to the president is constitutional, if it does not leave
“the expediency or just operation of such legislation” to the president’s
determination and thus, “d[oes] not in any real sense invest the [p]resident
with the power of legislation.”93 Furthermore, the intelligible principle test
is satisfied “if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the public
agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of th[e] delegated
authority.”94 The general policy and boundaries of delegated power can be
determined by reviewing the “purpose of the Act, its factual background
and the statutory context in which they appear.”95
In American Institute for International Steel, Inc. v. United States,96
the question before the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit (the
“Federal Circuit”) is whether “Section 232 [is] facially unconstitutional on
the ground that it does not impose any boundaries or limits on the
President’s powers under it and therefore constitutes an improper
delegation of legislative authority and violates the principles of separation
of powers established by the Constitution.”97
The Plaintiffs in American Institute for International Steel, Inc.
initially contested the constitutionality of Section 232 before the CIT,
where they asserted that the language of the statute is broad and overly
permissive and thus, departs from an ordinary understanding and
definition of national security as typically related to national defense and

to make rules – to the executive so long as it provided an ‘intelligible principle’ to govern
that discretion.”).
92
J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co., 276 U.S. at 409.
93
Id. at 410.
94
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989) (citing Am. Power & Light
Co. v. SEC, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)).
95
Am. Power & Light Co., 329 U.S. at 104.
96
On March 25, 2019, the Court of International Trade denied the Plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment. Thereafter, the Plaintiffs filed a petition for writ of certiorari but the
U.S. Supreme Court denied cert. As of August 25, 2019, the case is pending appeal at the
U.S. Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit. Alex Lawson, Bid to Limit Trump's Tariff
(Aug.
9,
2019),
Power
Lands
In
Fed.
Circ.,
LAW360
https://www.law360.com/articles/1187365.
97
Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Am. Inst. For Int’l Steel, Inc., and Sim-Tex, LP, Kurt
Orban Partners, LLC. at 2, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 19-1727 (Fed.
Cir. Aug. 9, 2019) (The other issue is “Did the Court of International Trade erroneously
conclude that Algonquin controls the outcome of this action?).
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foreign relations.98 Moreover, the Plaintiffs claimed that Section 232 lacks
limitations on the President’s interpretation of national security as it does
not provide any import restrictions based on type or quantity, and is
without tests to determine the veracity of potential threats.99 The CIT,
however, rejected the Plaintiffs’ claims.100
Contrary to the Plaintiffs’ claims in American Institute for
International Steel, Inc. that Section 232 is an unconstitutional delegation
of authority,101 the Supreme Court, in Federal Energy Administration, v.
Algonquin SNG, Inc., held that Section 232 is a proper delegation of
legislative power to the Executive because it “easily fulfills” the
intelligible principle test.102 Indeed, as the Plaintiffs claim, the language of
Section 232 indicates that President Trump is at liberty to declare almost
all imports as a threat to the national security.103 However, the Supreme
Court found that Section 232(d) provides broad yet detailed categories of
factors to consider when determining the magnitude of a threat.104
According to the Algonquin Court, Section 232 has specific
preconditions that guide the president’s exercise of discretion and thus,
satisfies the intelligible principle test.105 The Court stated that the president
does not have complete freedom when enacting tariffs, because: (1)
Section 232(b) permits an action after the president’s receipt of the Section
232 report from the DoC; and (2) the president can act only when it is
“necessary to adjust the imports of such article and its derivatives so that
such imports will not threaten to impair the national security.”106 By
finding these two factors as sufficient limitations on the president’s
exercise of discretion, the Court held that Section 232 satisfies the
See Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment at 5, Am.
Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:18-cv-00152 (U.S. Ct. Int’l. Trade July 19,
2018).
99
See Complaint, supra note 86, at 5–8.
100
See Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1345 (Ct.
Int’l Trade 2019).
101
See Complaint, supra note 86, at 7, 12–16, 18–19.
102
Fed. Energy Admin. v. Algonquin SNG, Inc., 426 U.S. 548, 558–60 (1928).
103
See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Am. Inst. For Int’l Steel, Inc., and Sim-Tex, LP,
Kurt Orban Partners, LLC., supra note 97, at 2 (“[T]he lack of any legislative boundaries
in section 232 enables the President to do whatever he chooses regarding tariffs, quotas, or
other restrictions on imports.”).
104
See Severstal Exp. GmbH v. United States, No. 18-37, slip op. at 20 (U.S. Ct. Int’l
Trade Apr. 5, 2018); see also Algonquin SNG., Inc., 426 U.S. at 559 (“[T]he leeway that
[Section 232] gives the President in deciding what action to take in the event the
preconditions are fulfilled is far from unbounded.”).
105
See Algonquin SNG., Inc., 426 U.S. at 559–60; see also Severstal Exp. GmbH, slip op.
at 22–23.
106
Algonquin SNG., Inc., 426 U.S. at 559; see 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii) (1970);
Severstal Exp. GmbH, slip op. at 22–23.
98
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intelligible principle test.107 Moreover, despite the AIIS’s claim that the
statute lacks clear guidelines, the Court concluded that there is no current
law or case that outlines the degree of specificity for governing standards
of delegated authority, or the need “to compel Congress to prescribe
detailed rules.”108
In addition to Section 232’s “clear preconditions to [p]residential
action,”109 the Algonquin Court held that the statute properly delegates the
legislative authority to the Executive because it outlines the general policy,
the acting agency, and the boundaries of the delegated authority.110
Furthermore, the Court refused to construe the statute narrowly “to avoid
‘a serious question of unconstitutional delegation of legislative power’”
because the standards of Section 232(b) are “clearly sufficient to meet any
delegation doctrine attack.”111 Relying on Algonquin, the CIT rejected the
Plaintiffs’ argument that Section 232 is without an intelligible principle.112
As such, the Plaintiffs face a significant challenge to persuade the Federal
Circuit to overturn the earlier ruling from Algonquin.
Although the Supreme Court has held that Section 232 satisfies the
intelligible principle test, the question remains whether the factors outlined
in the statute suffice. The current language of Section 232 undeniably lack
utility in judicial review because of the absence of specific rules and
standards the president is required to follow when adjusting imports.113
Thus, such lack of specificity forecloses the judicial power to enforce the
boundaries of the law, which aims to closely adhere to the intention of
Congress.114
Algonquin SNG., Inc., 426 U.S. at 560.
Id.
109
Id. at 559.
110
See id.; see also J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 408 (1928)
(“The Congress may not delegate its purely legislative power to a commission, but, having
laid down the general rules of action under which a commission shall proceed, it may
require of that commission the application of such rules to particular situations and the
investigation of facts, with a view to making orders in a particular matter within the rules
laid down by the Congress.”); Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 372–73 (1989)
(citing Am. Power & Light Co. v. Secs. & Exch. Comm’n, 329 U.S. 90, 105 (1946)) (A
statute is “constitutionally sufficient if Congress clearly delineates the general policy, the
public agency which is to apply it, and the boundaries of this delegated authority.”).
111
Algonquin SNG., Inc., 426 U.S. at 558–59.
112
Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1340 (Ct. Int’l
Trade 2019).
113
Response Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Opposition to Defendants’ Motion
for Judgment on the Pleadings and Reply Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs’ Motion
for Summary Judgement at 20–21, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 1:18cv-00152 (Ct. Intl. Trade Oct. 5, 2018).
114
See Chapman & McConell, supra note 66, at 1786 (“[T]here are no judicially
manageable standards for determining ‘the permissible degree of policy judgment that can
be left to those executing or applying the law.’”).
107
108
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The Lack of Judicial Review

Procedural checks, such as judicial review, are generally employed to
control and monitor various administrative agencies’ decision-making
procedures.115 The Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”)116 governs
federal agencies’ rulemaking procedures and provides standards of
judicial review for agency misconduct.117 In theory, petitioners of the
exclusion process and legal practitioners should be able to attack the
validity of the Section 232 Tariffs under the APA as an alternative to
challenging the constitutionality of the Section 232 Tariffs.118
Using the APA as a vehicle to challenge the tariffs remains
challenging, however, because the Supreme Court has held that the
president does not constitute “an agency” for the purposes of the APA and,
therefore, the president’s modification to tariffs and the corresponding
presidential proclamations do not constitute “agency action.”119 Because
the president is not subjected to the APA, any claims that attack the
president’s lack of compliance with the APA and other governing statutes
are moot.120 Thus, the Section 232 Tariffs are a by-product of President
Trump’s unconstitutional “blank check” from Section 232 because they
are not subjected to any legislative or judicial review.121 As such, the
statute grants the president the sole power to take action on imports as a
de facto agency of Congress; yet, the law fails to supply review as a
necessary check on the executive action.
Bound by Algonquin, the CIT did not find the lack of judicial review
to be unconstitutional in American Institute for International Steel, Inc.122
The CIT held that “presidential determinations committed to the
See Valerie C. Brannon, Cong. Research Serv., LSB10172, Can a President Amend
Regulations by Executive Order? (2018).
116
5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. (1946).
117
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 788, 796 (1992).
118
See id.
119
See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 796 (“We hold that the final action complained of is that of
the President, and the President is not an agency within the meaning of the Act.
Accordingly, there is no final agency action that may be reviewed under the APA
standards.”); Dalton v. Specter, 511 U.S. 462, 465 (1994) (“[T]he President's actions were
not reviewable under the APA, because the President is not an ‘agency’ within the meaning
of the APA. . . . [But] the ‘President's actions may still be reviewed for constitutionality.’”);
Michael Simon Design, Inc. v. United States, 609 F.3d 1335, 1337–38 (Fed. Cir. 2010).
120
See Franklin, 505 U.S. at 796; Dalton, 511 U.S. at 465.
121
See United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 602 (1995) (Thomas, J., concurring)
(reasoning that a federal government’s control that impedes on the local government is an
unconstitutional blank check; “[s]uch a formulation of federal power is no test at all: it is a
blank check”).
122
See Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1341 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2019) (“[T]here has been no change in the legal landscape since Algonquin as
far as section 232 is concerned.”).
115
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President’s discretion by an enabling statute are not subject to review for
rationality, findings of fact, or abuse of discretion.”123 Moreover, the court
found that Congress intentionally “precluded an inquiry for rationality,
fact finding, or abuse of discretion” by excluding any qualifying language
or standard on the president’s concurrence with the DoC’s findings from
the Section 232 investigations.124 As such, the CIT rejected the Plaintiffs’
claim that Section 232’s lack of judicial review violates the constitutional
system of checks and balances125 and held that Congress had intended the
president’s determination to be left to his discretion without judicial
review.126
Although the CIT’s analysis is consistent with the findings in
Algonquin, the CIT neglected to consider an important issue in the
intelligible principle test: whether the statute leaves the operation of the
intended legislation to the determination of the president.127
Notwithstanding the CIT’s findings that Congress intended to allow the
president to make judgments based on his or her discretion without any
limitations or qualifications, the question remains whether Congress
properly outlined the intelligible principle in Section 232 to facilitate the
accountability of the president’s actions.
In Yakus, the Supreme Court held that if “Congress has specified the
basic conditions of fact upon whose existence or occurrence, ascertained
from relevant data by a designated administrative agency, it directs that its
statutory command shall be effective.”128 Because the objective of judicial
review is “to ascertain whether the will of Congress has been obeyed [by
the President],” the Court reasoned that a statute that clearly outlines the
boundaries and guidelines of the president’s power is sufficient to
determine whether he or she complied to Congress’s will.129 Moreover, the
Court held that a statute with specific guidelines that “are sufficiently
definite and precise [will] enable Congress, the courts and the public to
ascertain whether the [president] . . . has conformed to those standards.”130
Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 1343.
Id.
125
See Complaint, supra note 86, at 1, 19.
126
See Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 1343 (“the President's
determination as to the form of remedial action is a matter ‘in the judgment of the
President.’”) (citing 19 U.S.C. § 1862(c)(1)(A)(ii)).
127
See J. W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States, 276 U.S. 394, 410 (1928) (discussing
that a delegation is proper if the statute does not leave “the expediency or just operation of
[] legislation” to the determination of the president.).
128
Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414, 424–25 (1944).
129
Id. at 425 (“This depends . . . upon the determination whether the definition
sufficiently marks the field within which the Administrator is to act so that it may be known
whether he has kept within it in compliance with the legislative will.”).
130
Id. at 426.
123
124
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Accordingly, Section 232 may seem self-sufficient without judicial review
as the Algonquin Court held that the statute broadly outlines the boundaries
of the president’s actions: he or she can adjust imports for the exclusive
sake of national security.131
In practice, however, Section 232 does not plainly set the boundaries
for presidential power due to the lack of guidance for courts and Congress
to regulate the executive action. Section 232 fails to meet the preconditions
laid out in Yakus because it fails to outline: (1) any statutory
requirement(s) for the president to follow the DoC’s recommendations; (2)
guidelines on determining the method of remedial measure(s); and (3)
rationale(s) on selecting the number of rates for the remedial measures.132
The broad and permissive language of Section 232, which lacks
“definite and precise” standards, inhibits Congress’s ability to ascertain
whether the president has complied to Congress’s will.133 It “provides
virtually unbridled discretion to the [p]resident with respect to the power
over trade that is reserved by the Constitution to Congress.”134 Although
the president’s interpretations of the statute—that are plainly unrelated to
national security—would be subject to judicial review, in theory,
“identifying the line between regulation of trade in furtherance of national
security and an impermissible encroachment into the role of Congress
could be elusive in some cases because judicial review would allow neither
an inquiry into the [p]resident’s motives nor a review of his factfinding.”135
Without specific boundaries on the president’s exercise of discretion,
there is potential for presidential abuse of power.136 For example, the
president could make a decision to impose tariffs on an import that poses

See Defendants’ Reply in Support of their Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at
5–6, Am. Inst. for Int’l Steel, Inc. v. United States, No. 18-00152 (Ct. Int’l Trade Nov. 9,
2018).
132
See Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel, Inc. v. United States, 376 F. Supp. 3d 1335, 1346 (Ct.
Int'l Trade 2019) (Katzmann, J., dubitante).
133
See Yakus, 321 U.S. at 425–26.
134
Am. Inst. for Int'l Steel, Inc., 376 F. Supp. 3d at 1352 (Katzmann, J., dubitante).
135
Id. at 1344–45 (“One might argue that the statute allows for a gray area where the
President could invoke the statute to act in a manner constitutionally reserved for Congress
but not objectively outside the President’s statutory authority, and the scope of review
would preclude the uncovering of such a truth.”).
136
See Chapman & McConell, supra note 66, at 1785 (“A certain degree of interpretive
discretion is inherent in law execution, however precisely crafted, is self-defining with
respect to all conceivable applications. Yet at a certain point, broad delegations of
standardless power to the executive strain the understanding that the executive can regulate
conduct only pursuant to law.”).
131
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no facially possible threat to the nation’s security, such as peanut butter.137
However, Section 232 executive power is untouchable by virtue of its nonjusticiability, which resulted in the courts’ implicit declaration that “the
discretion claimed by the executive is genuinely rooted in congressional
delegation.”138
In American Institute for International Steel, Inc., the Federal Circuit
must decide whether Section 232 is a permissible delegation of Congress’s
authority.139 The Federal Circuit should interpret Section 232 under strict
scrutiny “to ensure that [the] delegation is the genuine intention of
Congress, and not an instance of executive overreach.”140

III. THE LEGISLATIVE FIGHT OVER THE SECTION 232 TARIFFS
Since the enactment of President Trump’s Section 232 Tariffs, both
Democratic and Republican lawmakers have proposed numerous
legislative bills to limit the President’s Section 232 authority, though they
were short-lived.141
Immediately following the government shutdown in late-January
2019, however, President Trump and the Section 232 Tariffs became a
political relevant once again, as both supporters and opponents of the
tariffs introduced new bills.142 Bi-partisan and non-partisan groups of the
House and Senate have proposed several bills to curtail the President’s
authority under Section 232, such as the Global Trade Accountability Act
of 2019,143 the Bicameral Congressional Trade Authority Act,144 the Trade
Security Act of 2019,145 the Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority
See Alex Lawson, Trade Court Grapples With Trump’s Security-Based Tariffs,
Law360 (Dec. 19, 2018), https://www.law360.com/articles/1113210/trade-court-grappleswith-trump-s-security-based-tariffs.
138
Chapman & McConell, supra note 66, at 1786.
139
See Brief of Plaintiffs-Appellants Am. Inst. For Int’l Steel, Inc., and Sim-Tex, LP,
Kurt Orban Partners, LLC., supra note 97, at 2.
140
Chapman & McConell, supra note 66, at 1786.
141
See Claussen, supra note 68; Jordain Carney, Senate Takes Symbolic Shot at Trump
Tariffs, THE HILL (July 11, 2018, 1:24 PM), https://thehill.com/blogs/flooraction/senate/396505-senate-takes-symbolic-shot-at-trump-tariffs; Bryan Koenig, Sens.
Propose Bipartisan Bill to Curb Trump’s Tariff Powers, LAW360 (Aug. 1, 2018, 7:21 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/1069273/sens-propose-bipartisan-bill-to-curb-trump-stariff-powers.
142
See Niquette, supra note 59; Megan Cassella, Lawmakers Prep Bipartisan Bill to
Curtail Trump’s Tariff Authority, POLITICO (Jan. 25, 2019, 6:44 PM),
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/25/limit-trump-tarriffs-1120215.
143
Trade Accountability Act of 2019, H.R. 723, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019).
144
Bicameral Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, H.R. 940, 116th Cong. § 1
(2019).
145
Trade Security Act of 2019, H.R. 1008, 116th Cong. § 1 (2019).
137
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Act of 2019,146 and the Promoting Responsible and Free Trade Act of
2019.147 Although these bills vary in their methods of altering Section 232
authority and are sponsored by different partisan-groups, they all have a
common objective: to limit the executive power in adjusting imports.148
The likelihood for one of these bills to pass as law remains hopeful as they
are supported by both chambers of Congress, along with sponsors from
the manufacturing and farming industries.149
Even if one of these bills is enacted under the Trump Administration,
however, President Trump will likely veto the bill due to his support for
the United States Reciprocal Trade Act (the “RTA”).150 Introduced by
Republican lawmakers, the RTA seeks to expand the President’s authority
to increase tariffs in response to any foreign trade barriers imposed upon
American products.151 If passed, President Trump would have even wider
liberty to control trade.152 Thus, President Trump is an avid supporter of
the RTA and has urged Congress to support this Act.153
The enactment of any one of these bills will alter Section 232 by either
curtailing or expanding the President’s trade prerogative to control
imports. Nevertheless, even if none of these bills becomes law, lawmakers
will likely persevere to modify Section 232 through repeal or
amendment.154 A repeal of Section 232 would likely remove the statute’s
delegation of legislative power to the President, and consequently
invalidate all Section 232 tariffs, if applied retroactively.155 Although such
repeal would eliminate this entire issue, President Trump would likely veto
any potential repeal of Section 232 due to his support for the RTA.

Reclaiming Congressional Trade Authority Act of 2019, S. 899, 116th Cong. § 1
(2019).
147
Promoting Responsible and Free Trade Act of 2019, H.R. 3673, 116th Cong. § 1
(2019).
148
See Niquette, supra note 59; Carney, supra note 141; Koenig, supra note 141;
Cassella, supra note 142.
149
See Niquette, supra note 59.
150
See United States Reciprocal Trade Act, H.R. 764, 116th Cong § 1 (2019).
151
See Megan Cassella, Draft Trade Bill Would Give Trump Expansive Powers to Raise
(Jan.
11,
2019,
2:30
PM),
Tariffs,
POLITICO
https://www.politico.com/story/2019/01/11/trade-bill-trump-tariffs-1079424.
152
Id.
153
See Alex Lawson, Momentum Builds to Check Trump’s Trade Power, LAW360 (Feb.
6, 2019, 8:33 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/1126546/momentum-builds-tocheck-trump-s-trade-power; See Jenny Leonard & Jennifer Jacobs, White House to Roll
Out Bill to Expand Trump’s Tariff Powers, Sources Say, BLOOMBERG (Jan. 8, 2019, 11:01
PM), https://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2019-01-09/white-house-is-said-to-rollout-bill-to-expand-tariff-powers.
154
See Claussen, supra note 68.
155
See id.
146
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Revision of Section 232 is a more realistic options. Therefore, revision
should be prioritized to establish a compromise for both supporters and
opponents of the Section 232 Tariffs. For example, Congress may restrict
the President’s creation of new tariffs by expanding Section 232’s
exception provision to include additional items or outline countries
subjected to limitations.156 Analogous to the exception for petroleum
products, an amendment to Section 232’s exception provision could
require the president to request for Congress’s approval prior to imposing
tariffs on particular products or countries.157 Alternatively, Congress may
amend the broad and permissive language of Section 232 to incorporate
comprehensive standards on how and what the president can do to adjust
imports. In the absence of judicial review, these standards will allow the
people and the nation to determine whether the president has acted within
the scope of law.158

IV. CONCLUSION
The future of Section 232 and the Section 232 Tariffs can be
determined by either: (1) the pending decision from the Federal Circuit in
American Institute for International Steel, Inc.; or (2) the enactment of a
bill to either expand or limit executive power to adjust imports. If a
legislative bill is not enacted prior to the Federal Circuit’s decision, the
Federal Circuit will determine the constitutionality of the statute and the
future of the Section 232 Tariffs. If the Plaintiffs prevail, the court may
repeal the tariffs and eliminate Congress’s deference in delegating its
legislative authority to levy taxes and control commerce. Such a decision
may halt any future executive orders under Section 232 and prevent
President Trump and future presidents from manipulating the definition of
national security to use it as a false pretense for the furtherance of personal
or non-security related objectives.
Despite President Trump’s portrayal of tariffs as an American victory,
using tariffs as a negotiation tactic is precarious and should be avoided.
Trade-related actions that are taken to limit other nations’ power may in
turn harm the United States. For example, the continuation of the Section
232 Tariffs is projected to shrink the American economy by increasing the
price of goods while reducing American exports, thereby decreasing gross
domestic product by about 0.3% and household income by $580 in
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2020.159 Moreover, the Section 232 Tariffs have left American citizens
vulnerable because they are forced to face the consequences of tariffs on
imports from a sole or dominant exporting country.160 Although President
Trump intended to limit trading partners’ enrichment from exports to the
United States, these countries have continued to prosper because they
increase consumer prices to compensate for the exporting fees.161
Similarly, American manufacturers and farmers have also confronted
tariffs imposed by retaliating countries.162
Although the fate of Section 232 remains ambiguous, the future of the
statute’s delegation of power remains unobstructed: the United States will
continue to levy new tariffs, quotas, or other restrictions on a variety of
imports from numerous trading partners while those countries retaliate by
issuing comparable or higher rates on American exports. Under the Trump
Administration, there is no foreseeable ending of the tariff tug-of-war
unless the Federal Circuit or Congress intervenes to limit Section 232’s
untouchable executive authority.
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